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Summary 
 
This study builds upon the explorative study of Hoekstra (2006), who puts forward an argument for coordination 
at the global level in ‘water governance’. Water governance is understood here in the broad sense as ‘the way 
people use and maintain water resources’. One of the factors that give water governance a global dimension is 
‘virtual water trade’ between nations, i.e. the trade in water in virtual form through trade in water-containing 
products. Virtual water trade involves advantages as well as disadvantages. The development of institutional 
arrangements to account for these disadvantages has not kept pace with the enhancement of international trade 
in general and virtual water trade in particular. 
 
The objective of this study is to design alternative institutional arrangements to deal with the global dimension 
of water governance. The study elaborates three arrangements: a Water Pricing Protocol, a Business Agreement 
on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods, and a system of Water Footprint Permits. The three 
institutional arrangements are aimed to improve the ecological sustainability, economic efficiency and social 
equity of water governance. The arrangements aim to influence change agents in the virtual water chain (the 
production chain of water-containing products). Behavioural mechanisms bring about behavioural change of 
other agents in the virtual water chain. 
 
We define the Water Pricing Protocol as an international agreement on water pricing structures that cover the 
full cost of water use, including investment costs, operational and maintenance costs, a water scarcity rent and 
the cost of negative externalities of water use. Such a protocol will favour an efficient and sustainable use of 
water resources. By putting a price on water, conservation becomes economically efficient. The Water Pricing 
Protocol should account for the issue of social equity. The greatest challenge is to bring the theory of full 
marginal cost pricing into practice. Practical difficulties involve the flowing character of water, disruption of 
historical water management systems and the need for national capacity to set up the institutions necessary for 
water pricing.  
 
We define the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods as an agreement 
between companies that commit themselves to report on the impacts of their business on water resources. Such 
an agreement will promote sustainable and efficient water governance. The Business Agreement merits from the 
fact that it focuses on so-called ‘channel leaders’ (agents in the production chain capable of imposing their will 
on other agents). In the Business Agreement, channel leaders agree on a standardized chain-based measuring 
and reporting method for the sustainable use of water resources. Sustainability reporting is done in corporate 
responsibility publications. In this way, companies can compare the environmental performance of their 
products over time and with the products of others. This may lead to the conservation of resources. The fact that 
the Business Agreement is not binding threatens its effectiveness. 
 
A system of Water Footprint Permits defines a maximum global water footprint, which is allocated among 
participating countries. The system of Water Footprint Permits favours a fair allocation of global water 
resources among the people of the Earth. The water footprint of an individual is defined as the total volume of 
freshwater used to produce the goods and services consumed by that individual. Comparable to the Kyoto 
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Protocol, nations voluntarily participate in the system. The state parties define a global maximum water 
footprint each six years. This global maximum is allocated to nations, based on the number of inhabitants. When 
a nation’s water footprint is smaller than its permit, the national government can sell part of their permit to 
countries whose water footprint is bigger than its permit. It can also reduce its water footprint by applying 
domestic instruments to change the behaviour of stakeholders in the virtual water chain. The transaction costs of 
the system are the highest of all institutional arrangements investigated. Whether the benefits outweigh the costs 
remains a topic of further research.  
 
The institutional arrangements are not mutually exclusive. All three institutional arrangements require 
monitoring efforts, which can be combined. On the other hand, combinations may be less effective than the sum 
of effects of the separate institutional arrangements. A combination of Water Footprint Permits and the Business 
Agreement is promising. This way, governments, civil society and business society involve in the equitable and 
sustainable water governance at the global level. 
 
The study was a first-order exploration of possible institutional arrangements for global water governance. 
Further research should adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach. Strategic alliances with other 
institutional arrangements are possible. Water Footprint Permits are much more relevant when combined with 
Ecological Footprint Permits. A Water Pricing Protocol will be more effective when combined with other 
measures to change existing subsidy schemes, particularly the US and EU agricultural subsidy schemes. 
Designing and implementing global institutions to account for the global dimension of water governance 
requires forms of communication, information, and trust that are broad and deep beyond precedent, but not 
beyond possibility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The United Nations General Assembly, in December 2003, proclaimed the years 2005 to 2015 as the 
International Decade for Action 'Water for Life'. The primary goal of the Decade is to promote efforts to fulfil 
international commitments made on water and water-related issues by 2015 (UN-Water, 2003, 2006; Martinez 
Austia & Van Hofwegen, 2006). Although achieving good water governance is regarded as a global challenge, 
water governance is generally seen as a local or regional issue. Where water issues extend beyond the borders of 
local communities, the river basin is generally seen as the most appropriate unit for analysis, planning and  
institutional arrangements (UNGA, 1997; GWP, 2000). As a result, most efforts focus on seeking proper 
institutional arrangements (structures or mechanisms of social order and cooperation) at a local or river basin 
level. 
 
The international water community, for two reasons, has not recognized the necessity of global coordination in 
‘water governance’. Water governance is understood here in the broad sense as ‘the way people use and 
maintain water resources’. First, coordination at the global level seems to be at odds with the subsidiarity 
principle, which states that water issues should be handled at the lowest governance level possible. Second, 
global water resources are not scarce, because aggregate annual withdrawals are and will remain below annual 
renewable water resources at the global level (Gleick, 1993; Postel et al., 1996; Shiklomanov, 2000; Vörösmarty 
et al., 2000; Zehnder et al., 2003). The issue is rather the mismatch between water demand and supply at smaller 
spatial scale at particular periods of the year. 
 
Hoekstra (2006) shows, however, that water governance does have a global dimension. The most important 
factors that give water governance a global dimension, include (i) climate change, (ii) privatization of drinking 
water, sanitation and irrigation services, and (iii) increasing ‘virtual water trade’ between nations (the trade in 
water virtually embedded in traded goods and services). The latter factor received little academic attention until 
five years ago (Hoekstra, 2003). Thus far, virtual water trade has been researched either to quantitatively assess 
actual virtual water flows between nations (Hoekstra, 2003; Zimmer & Renault, 2003; Oki and Kanae, 2004; 
Hoekstra & Hung, 2005; Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2008), or with a policy focus at the national or regional level 
(Allan, 1998, 2001; Turton, 2000).  
 
Institutional responses have not kept pace with the effects of climate change, privatization and trade 
liberalization that have led to or are expected to lead to changes in water supply or demand in various places. 
People traditionally regard water scarcity as a responsibility of the national government or of the producers of 
agricultural products. The production of agricultural products accounts for 70% of total global water 
withdrawals (Shiklomanov, 2000). Hoekstra (2003) has proposed a ‘water footprint’ as an indicator that 
emphasizes the link between consumption and water use. The water footprint of an individual is defined as the 
total volume of freshwater used to produce the goods and services consumed by that individual. The water 
footprint can be related to a problem of water depletion or pollution near the production site, for instance in the 
case of European cotton consumers and the desiccation of the Aral Sea (Micklin, 1988; Chapagain et al., 2006). 
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Figure 1.1 shows that many parts of the world depend on foreign water resources to sustain their lifestyles, 
making water a global resource.  
 
Figure 1.1: Water scarcity based on a consumer oriented indicator: water footprint as a percentage of total actual 
renewable water resources (Data source: Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004). 
 
1.2. Objective and scope 
 
The objective of this study is to design alternative institutional arrangements to deal with the global dimension 
of water governance. It elaborates a number of the institutional arrangements that have been introduced by 
Hoekstra (2006). The current study still has an explorative character, which is inherent to the subject. We are 
aware that fundamentally different perspectives do exist with respect to the desirability and feasibility of the 
types of arrangements elaborated here. We feel therefore that some reflection at the enterprise of this study from 
the beginning is necessary. 
 
A relevant question that can be posed is why at all one would design institutional arrangements? Are not 
institutional arrangements evolving by themselves when desired? Economists generally assume that rational 
utility maximizers will reach agreement on mutually beneficial institutional arrangements whenever a zone of 
agreement exists. In this view, this will lead to a Pareto-optimal institutional arrangement, much like the 
Smithsonian ‘invisible hand’ of a free market. Thus, the rational process of institutional design (the deliberate 
formulation of an institutional arrangement) is largely unnecessary and may even invite for interventions that 
result into suboptimal outcomes. However, Young (1989) claims that because of large asymmetries of 
bargaining strength among stakeholders, there is considerable scope for exercising leadership toward coherent 
and desirable outcomes by means of institutional design. In this study we adopt the latter view. 
 
Another question that arises is why global arrangements are necessary if local arrangements can be made as 
well? It is well conceivable that cumulative local arrangements may enhance good global water governance 
more efficiently or effectively than global arrangements would. At this stage of research on global water 
governance, it is premature to evaluate and compare arrangements across levels. This study is limited to the 
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design of global arrangements; we acknowledge that in a later stage the efficiencies of the global institutional 
arrangements designed here have to be compared to the efficiency of a multitude of local arrangements. 
 
A final question relates to the feasibility of global institutional arrangements. The conceptual designs made in 
this study form the starting point for the technical designs of legal contracts between agents. Without doubt, 
designing contracts will lead to new difficulties that are unaccounted for in the present study. The policy-making 
process can have large influence on the final design (Bressers and Huitema, 1999). We acknowledge this; it 
implies that we will not address the issue of political feasibility of the institutional arrangements designed. The 
study is limited to the designs themselves and the assessment of their likely economic, social and environmental 
effects.  
 

Global water governance / 11 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. The perspective of sustainable development 
 
The aim to design global institutional arrangements for global water governance (the way people collectively 
appropriate global water resources), is still broad. To benchmark the design of global institutional arrangements, 
this study adopts the concept of sustainable development.  
 
The Brundtland-report and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro mark the worldwide acceptance of the notion of 
sustainable development (WCED, 1987; UNCED, 1992). Sustainable development consists of three dimensions: 
the social, ecological, and economic dimension (Rogers et al., 1998; WSSD, 2002; Hildering, 2004). The 
business community often refers to these dimensions as people-planet-profit. In order to make these three 
dimensions more tangible, criteria have been proposed against which policy can be evaluated (Daly, 1996; 
Rogers et al., 2002). These criteria are ecological sustainability, social equity and economic efficiency. The need 
for indicators that cover these criteria results in the following overview: 
 
• Social equity: This can be measured by means of the Gini-coefficient, a measure of inequality of a 
distribution of resources (in this case: water resources). The Gini-coefficient is a ratio with values between 
0 (uniform distribution) and 1 (fully inequitable distribution). The numerator of this ratio is the area 
between the Lorenz curve of a distribution and the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the triangle 
area under the uniform distribution line. The uniform distribution line represents full social equity. 
• Ecological sustainability: For water governance, ecological sustainability requires human appropriation of 
water resources to stay within certain environmental limits. The position of these environmental limits is 
subjective to some extent. Raskin et al. (1997) introduced a simplified categorization of ecological 
sustainability. When the ‘criticality ratio’ (the withdrawal-to-availability ratio) is between 0.2 and 0.4, this 
is referred to as water stress, while a ratio above 0.4 is referred to as water scarce. Consequently, ecological 
sustainability occurs when the criticality ratio remains below 0.2. 
• Economic efficiency: This can be measured by the criterion of Pareto efficiency, which defines the 
economically optimal situation as the state in which no individual can be made better off without another 
being made worse off. 
 
A glance at the present and future situation of these criteria shows that without change, global water governance 
will not reach a condition of social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency.  
 
With regard to social equity, water footprints differ strongly among countries, partly because of differences in 
consumption but also partly because of differences in water productivities. While the average American has a 
water footprint of 2480 m3/cap/yr, China has an average water footprint of only 700 m3/cap/yr (Chapagain & 
Hoekstra, 2004). Many countries have an average per capita water footprint below the threshold value required 
for sufficient food, which is about 1000 m3/cap/yr (Zehnder et al., 2003; UN-Water, 2006).  
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With reference to ecological sustainability, Postel et al. (1996) argue that if average per capita water demand 
remains the same in 2025 compared to the 1990 level (which is conservative, because withdrawals per capita 
increased nearly 50% between 1950 and 1990), human appropriation of geographically and temporally 
accessible runoff will be 70%. Because Postel et al. (1996) do not account for environmental flow requirements; 
this figure implies a large strain on ecosystems throughout the world. The three main reasons for an increasing 
human appropriation of water resources are (i) an increasing human population, (ii) increasing standards of 
living and (iii) the growing need for biomass as an energy carrier. 
 
With respect to economic efficiency, the price of water resources generally does not reflect all costs. Failing 
price structures, perverse subsidies and privatization without sound regulation are common in both developed 
and developing countries (Van der Zaag & Savenije, 2006; UNDP, 2006). In such situations, countries that 
import water-intensive goods profit to the detriment of vulnerable water users in exporting countries that lack a 
strong voice, such as small farmers, fishermen, women or local ecosystems. 
 
2.2. The virtual water chain 
 
This study adopts the concept of the ‘virtual water chain’, a concept that fits in the tradition of production chain 
analysis as known from the field of Life Cycle Assessment. The virtual water chain is the chain of production 
and consumption of water-intensive goods. A typical virtual water chain consists of a farmer at the primary 
production end, a consumer at the consumption end and, depending on the commodity at stake, some 
intermediaries such as a food processor and a retailer (Figure 2.1). Causal connections and behavioural 
mechanisms operate through the virtual water chain. An effective institutional arrangement may have a direct 
effect on agents in one particular stage of the chain, but indirectly influence the behaviour of other agents in the 
chain. For example, raising the price of water withdrawal in agriculture can eventually lead to a higher 
consumer price for water-intensive products.  
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Figure 2.1: The virtual water chain. 
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2.3. Three global institutional arrangements 
 
This study elaborates three alternative global institutional arrangements that derive from a longer list presented 
by Hoekstra (2006): the Water Pricing Protocol, the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting, and the 
Water Footprint Permits. The three arrangements have been selected, because they are complementary in two 
ways: i) they address different criteria of sustainable development (Figure 2.2) and ii) they focus on different 
actors in the virtual water chain (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: How the three institutional arrangements are supposed to affect the criteria of sustainable 
development primarily (full arrow) and secondarily (dashed arrow).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: How the three institutional arrangements are supposed to affect different agents of the virtual water 
chain directly (the arrows) and indirectly (through the connections between the chain agents). 
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1. Water Pricing Protocol 
The Dublin Conference in 1992 has accepted to regard water as an economic and social good (ICWE, 1992). To 
date, however, few national or local authorities have implemented the principle of water as an economic good. 
Unilateral implementation is expected to be at the cost of the countries moving ahead (although it may also 
stimulate innovation which is in the benefit of the countries moving ahead first, see Bressers and Rosenbaum, 
2003). An international protocol on water pricing (Water Pricing Protocol) may help to overcome this problem. 
A Water Pricing Protocol would serve as a global agreement on water pricing structures that cover the full cost 
of water use, including investment costs, operational and maintenance costs, a water scarcity rent and the cost of 
negative externalities of water use. The Water Pricing Protocol primarily promotes economic efficiency and 
secondarily ecological sustainability. The main agents in a Water Pricing Protocol are producers of water-
intensive products. 
 
2. Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods 
Hall (2000) claims that chain dynamics can be triggered when there is a ‘channel leader’ with sufficient power 
over its suppliers (the extent to which one stakeholder can impose its will on other stakeholders in the supply 
chain), with technical competencies, and under specific environmental pressure. In global water governance, 
large manufacturers or retailers are candidates to become channel leaders of certain virtual water containing 
products. Providing them with a standardized method for sustainability reporting may improve the ecologically 
sustainable development of water resources. This standardized method would have to be agreed upon in a 
Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods. 
 
3. Water Footprint Permits 
The limited availability of freshwater resources implies that there is a sustainable maximum to the human water 
footprint (the amount of water needed for the production of all goods and services). The question is how large a 
nation’s or individual’s share of the globe’s fresh water resources can be. An institutional arrangement on this 
matter is comparable to the Kyoto Protocol on the emission of greenhouse gases. A system of water footprint 
permits would define a maximum global water footprint and share it among the participating countries or 
individuals. The system of water footprint permits promotes social equity and ecological sustainability. The 
main agents are consumers (represented by their government).  
 
2.4. Design method 
 
The design method is an iterative process as shown in Figure 2.4. This process is followed for each of the three 
institutional arrangements separately. The first step is to formulate the rationale of the arrangement. A rationale 
describes why an arrangement can contribute to social equity, ecological sustainability or economic efficiency. 
The rationale is the basic argument to elaborate an institutional arrangement. 
 
The second step is to design a possible institutional set-up per institutional arrangement. Although institutions 
have been in place throughout human history, institutional design has only been a topic of scientific research 
since the 1990s (Goodin, 1996; Weimer, 1995). In fact, academic knowledge about existing global institutional 
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arrangements, or ‘international regimes’ as some scholars label it, is still limited (Rittberger & Mayer, 1993; 
Young, 1989, 1999ab). International regimes are sets of rules, roles and relationships, or issue-specific 
institutional arrangements that may or may not be legally binding, may or may not assign some role to UN 
agencies, and often accord important roles to non-state actors (Young, 1999a). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Design method 
 
The fact that knowledge about international regimes is still evolving, and the fact that it does not offer a design 
method for successful institutional arrangements, does not attenuate its legitimate notion of the presence and 
impact of such arrangements at the global level. Young (1989; 1999ab) acknowledges this view and offers a 
rather pragmatic approach to institutional design. Following this approach, this study defines that the 
institutional set-up should include:  
 
• who holds rights and duties in the institutional arrangement; 
• what is being arranged in the institutional arrangement; 
• how do behavioural mechanisms work through the virtual water chain; 
• how do these mechanisms promote compliance with the institutional arrangement. 
 
The third step is to make an assessment of effects by qualitatively evaluating each institutional arrangement on 
its projected impact on social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency. The impact can be either 
positive or negative:  
 
• Social equity considerations involve the impact institutional arrangements have on economic opportunities 
in developing countries, reflected in, for example, the price of basic food commodities. 
• From an economic efficiency perspective, the benefits of the arrangement should outweigh its transaction 
and opportunity costs.  
• From an ecological sustainability point of view, the arrangements should be sufficient to arrive at a 
sustainable level of water use.  
 
After having assessed the effects per institutional arrangement, we reflect on each arrangement by addressing a 
number of topics that relate to the feasibility of the arrangements:  
 
• We discuss the compatibility of the institutional arrangements with their legal context. Important documents 
of international environmental law are the Stockholm Declaration (UNCHE, 1972), the Rio Declaration 
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(UNCED, 1992) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (WSSD, 2002). The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) trade rules represent international trade law.  
• Evaluation of the political feasibility of the arrangements depends on the school taken as a starting point. 
Realism is a scholarly tradition in international relations that pictures world politics to be a struggle for 
power between states, in which every state tries to maximize its own interests. The opposing tradition is that 
of institutional liberalism, a tradition that believes in cooperation under conditions of anarchy. The design 
of institutional arrangements typically falls within the latter tradition. As a result the arrangements can be 
contested particularly from a realist’s point of view. 
• Water issues relate to broader issues, including environmental, social and economic ones. It may therefore 
be naïve to design institutional arrangements for water governance alone. The study identifies possible 
alliances that make the arrangements more feasible and effective. 
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3. Water Pricing Protocol 
 
3.1. Rationale 
 
Around the globe, governments subsidize freshwater provision and wastewater treatment. As a result, there is a 
lack of incentive for water users to conserve water, not pollute water and use the resource as efficient as 
possible. The lack of incentive is to the detriment of a country’s natural freshwater capital and leads to a 
suboptimal use and allocation of water resources.  
 
A way to increase economic efficiency is to put a price on freshwater. Governments are reluctant to pricing 
water, however, for economic or socio-cultural reasons. One of these reasons is of macro-economic concern: a 
country that unilaterally increases water prices affects the international competitiveness of its national producers 
of water-intensive products. International agreement on water pricing diminishes this disadvantage. 
 
3.2. Institutional set-up 
 
3.2.1. Parties of the Water Pricing Protocol 
 
The envisaged Water Pricing Protocol focuses on irrigated agriculture and water use in industry, because the 
main concern in an international Water Pricing Protocol is the water used for export products. Generally, 
irrigation agencies set prices for irrigated agriculture. Industries extract water directly from the environment, 
sometimes controlled by a regulating authority. Ideally, irrigation agencies and the regulating authorities are the 
signatories to a Water Pricing Protocol. However, it is justified to invite state parties to be signatories for the 
following three reasons. 
 
First, the concept of state sovereignty forms the base of international treaty law. States are accountable in 
international law. Second, irrigating cash crops is an important part of national economic development and 
irrigation networks are often under direct supervision of a national governmental department. Third, industries 
often have the power to arrange individual water abstraction and disposal, with limited governmental 
involvement. Even in OECD countries, 75% of total water consumption by the industrial sector comes directly 
from the environment (Jones, 1999). Committing national governments to the Water Pricing Protocol may urge 
them to force industries to reduce harmful wastes and the depletion of resources.  
 
3.2.2. Selection of a pricing method  
 
Johansson et al. (2002) identify four alternative methods for water pricing in irrigated agriculture, the sector that 
represents the major part of water demand at the global level:  
• Volumetric pricing methods charge for water based on the quantities of water consumed. A special case of 
volumetric pricing is marginal cost pricing. Marginal cost pricing equates the price of a unit of water with 
the marginal cost of supplying the last unit of water. When neglecting transaction costs, marginal cost 
pricing is the only pricing method able to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation. However, marginal cost 
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pricing requires a system of pricing, metering, billing, fee collection and fund allocation. When these 
activities involve relatively large overhead costs, other methods may become more efficient. 
• Non-volumetric pricing methods charge for water based on output, input, area or land values. Particularly 
pricing on a per area basis is popular, because this method is easy to implement and administer. Metering is 
not necessary, but this pricing method still requires a system of pricing, billing, fee collection and fund 
allocation. 
• Water markets are local institutions in which market pressures determine the price of water. Water markets 
require a system of property rights or water use rights, and both infrastructure and institutions to divert 
water. Water markets are more flexible than centrally controlled allocation mechanisms. 
• Assigning quotas to individual farmers to some extent mitigate equity issues or resource management issues 
that arise with a water market or marginal cost pricing.  
Theoretically, the concept of marginal cost pricing is favourable, because of the prospect to reach Pareto-
efficiency. Because the scope of this study is restricted to the global dimension of water governance, large 
irrigation schemes used for the production of export products are of main interest. This study proposes to limit 
the scope of the Water Pricing Protocol to large irrigation schemes producing export products. Such schemes 
may have a large impact on local water resources. At the same time, the number of farmers in such schemes is 
relatively small, so overhead costs (pricing, metering, billing, fee collection and fund allocation) are modest. 
That means that marginal cost pricing is generally favourable in such schemes. 
 
Marginal cost pricing involves the set-up of national institutions to cover the activities of pricing, metering, 
billing, fee collection and fund allocation. In the Water Pricing Protocol, state parties are free to determine how 
to arrange the activities of metering, billing and fee collection. However, as will be described in the next two 
sections, the Water Pricing Protocol does provide for guidelines for the marginal cost pricing methodology and 
fund allocation. 
 
3.2.3. Marginal cost pricing methodology  
 
Marginal cost pricing leaves enough room to tailor systems to situational circumstances. However, it is 
important to apply the same methodology to put a price on water everywhere when agreeing on a Water Pricing 
Protocol. Otherwise, the Protocol will suffer from many disputes between parties. 
 
Rogers et al. (1998) provide for a further elaboration on the methodology of marginal cost pricing. They make a 
distinction between costs, benefits and prices. In a monopolistic market, which is mostly the case in water 
governance, the government is the sole supplier and determines the price. To promote an efficient allocation, the 
government should set the price equal to the marginal cost of the supplied quantity where marginal costs and 
benefits are equal.  
 
According to Rogers et al. (1998), the marginal cost consists of five components: (i) capital charges; (ii) 
operational and maintenance costs; (iii) scarcity rent, (iv) economic externalities and (v) environmental 
externalities. According to Rogers et al. (1998), there are many ways to calculate each cost component. In the 
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Water Pricing Protocol, the domestic water-pricing agencies are free to determine the methodology to calculate 
the cost components. However, water-pricing agencies will not always have the capacity to determine a price. 
Particularly the scarcity rent and environmental externalities are difficult to determine (see next Section). The 
Global Water Partnership could set up a water-pricing toolbox like the IWRM toolbox (see Section 3.4.1) in 
order to assist water-pricing agencies.  
 
In many cases, setting the ‘right’ price will be a matter of trial and error. In order to arrange that prices are not 
set unreasonably high, the Water Pricing Protocol allows for an incremental approach. In this approach, a water-
pricing agency imposes the rise in price incrementally and combines the increase with service improvements 
where possible. The disadvantage is that water-pricing agencies will not be able to cover all costs in the first 
years. 
 
Marginal cost pricing ignores equity concerns and does not guarantee full cost recovery under all circumstances. 
Therefore, three adjustments are permissible to account for local or national interests (Tsur & Dinar, 1997): 
 
• Two-part tariff pricing methods extend the marginal cost pricing method with a fixed admission charge. 
This pricing method is appropriate in situations where a public utility produces with marginal cost below 
average cost while aiming to cover total costs. 
• With tiered pricing or block pricing, water rates vary as the amount of water consumed exceeds certain 
threshold values. It creates incentives for an individual farmer to stay within a certain block and thus, to 
save water. This pricing method can also level incomes among farmers. Block pricing is widely applied in 
urban areas as a panacea for the urban poor, but evidence of price perversities is stunning (UNDP, 2006; 
Van der Zaag & Savenije, 2006). Knowledge about local circumstances and the use of crop water 
requirements as a starting-point for determining the threshold values are prerequisites for applying block 
pricing. 
• A minimum water quota assures low-income farmers that are prone to be put out of business because of 
marginal cost pricing. 
 
3.2.4. Fund allocation  
 
A triangular relation develops between the beneficiaries of the water used, people harmed by the water use, and 
public agencies that provide for services of delivery and financing. Without institutions for allocation, fee 
collection makes the government a beneficiary. Therefore, the public agency that collects the fees should 
allocate the resulting fund to the cost components of the water provided to the beneficiary. The ease of this 
allocation depends on whether it is easy to determine (i) the extent of the cost component and (ii) to whom the 
fund should be allocated.  
 
Public agencies themselves bear the capital charges and operational and maintenance costs. Compensation is 
thus relatively easy. In an open democratic society, it is also relatively easy to determine the people subject to 
economic externalities. These people will reveal themselves when they object to major water abstractions. State 
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parties of the Water Pricing Protocol are free to determine the extent of the compensation. One way is by means 
of litigation, but the costs and risks involved might be a major obstacle for the people harmed. National 
governments may prefer to determine clear legal procedures for complaints and compensation. 
 
A scarcity rent is the cost of depleting scarce resources. The scarcity rent is relevant for non-renewable 
resources and overexploited renewable resources (e.g. a lake or an aquifer). Future generations can use the 
scarcity rent to match supply and demand of water resources in spite of the depletion of resources. Restoration 
of these resources, such as in progress in the Aral Sea, increases supply. Demand management has two features: 
adaptation to the new circumstances and the search for substitutes. Inherently, water is vital for crops and thus, 
there are no substitutes in irrigated agriculture. Therefore, the public agency should allocate the scarcity rent to 
adaptation or restoration options. Because of the time lag between pricing and financing of adaptation or 
restoration options, the public agency should put the money in a trust. This is why allocation of the scarcity rent 
is difficult. It is not clear which particular generation is justified to appropriate this ‘scarcity rent trust’. In 
addition, it is difficult to determine the extent of the scarcity rent, because the present generation cannot know 
how much future generations will value water resources. 
 
Local circumstances require a case-by-case analysis of the environmental impact of water abstraction and 
pollution. There are many ways to monetize environmental externalities, but all methods suffer from important 
disadvantages (Tietenberg, 2001). States are free to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies (UNCHE, 1972). In the Water Pricing Protocol, state parties are free to determine 
environmental externalities. Optionally, the Water Pricing Protocol can oblige parties to formulate 
environmental policies to guide the determination of environmental externalities.  
Table 3.1 shows that allocation is particularly difficult for the scarcity rent and environmental externalities. 
 
Table 3.1: Identification of the ease to allocate revenues to cost components of water use. 
 Is it easy to determine whom to compensate for harm? 
Is it easy to quantify the cost 
component? 
Capital charges Yes Yes 
Operations & maintenance Yes Yes 
Scarcity rent No No 
Economic externalities Yes No 
Environmental externalities No No 
 
 
3.2.5. Compliance mechanisms 
 
The wasteful use of water resources is to the detriment of the natural freshwater capital of a country. 
Implementing the concept of marginal cost pricing will be beneficial to an optimal national allocation of water 
resources. This is an important incentive for national governments to comply with the Water Pricing Protocol. 
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The Water Pricing Protocol tries to reduce distortions in international trade. Typically, the Protocol falls within 
the tradition of WTO trade rules. With regard to compliance issues, the Water Pricing Protocol can learn from 
these WTO trade rules. 
 
3.3. Assessment of effects 
 
3.3.1. Trade impacts for irrigated agriculture in developing countries 
 
Beneficiaries of irrigation are typically a privileged group within the agrarian sector. Where charges are low, 
they receive water services at the expense of the economy in general (Perry, 2001). Perry (2001) and FAO 
(2004) conclude that gradually setting prices to recover costs, combined with an increased performance of 
delivery service, does not negatively influence economic development of irrigated agriculture. Marginal cost 
pricing, therefore, does not necessarily put farmers in developing countries out of business. 
 
Water pricing only applies to irrigated agriculture, making rain-fed agriculture more attractive than irrigated 
agriculture. Rain-fed agriculture is most profitable under temperate climatic conditions, typically prevalent in 
developed countries. Rain-fed agriculture is subsidized, particularly in the European Union and the United 
States. Compensating this comparative disadvantage for irrigated agriculture thus lies outside the Water Pricing 
Protocol.  
 
3.3.2. Food still affordable for the poor in developing countries 
 
Applying marginal cost pricing to irrigated agriculture increases the costs of producing food. Producers pass this 
cost on to consumers, perhaps to the level that irrigated crops become unaffordable for poor households. This is 
why the scope of the Water Pricing Protocol is limited to large irrigation schemes producing export products. 
Problems arise when irrigation schemes produce commodities for both domestic and foreign consumption. 
Targeted subsidies to either the consumer or the producer in the domestic food market will bridge the gap 
between the marginal cost price and the affordable price. National governments are free to target these subsidies 
in a transparent way. 
 
3.3.3. Efficient practice is not necessarily sustainable 
 
The economic approach of marginal cost pricing assumes that natural resources and capital are exchangeable. 
The two flaws that occur here are that 1) water is not fully substitutable because it is a basic need and 2) the 
present generation cannot know how much future generations will value water resources, because there is no 
market to define market prices. As Tietenberg (2001) shows, an efficient allocation is not necessarily 
sustainable. To achieve ecological sustainability, the present generation may need to impose stronger rules on 
themselves. This study proposes to apply the three principles of intergenerational equity put forward by Brown 
Weiss (1989) to account for such stronger rules. These three principles of intergenerational equity are labelled 
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(i) conservation of options (ii) conservation of quality and (iii) conservation of access. According to these 
principles, the present generation should (Brown Weiss, 1989):  
• conserve the diversity of the natural (…) resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the options 
available to future generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own values; 
• maintain the quality of the planet comparable to the one enjoyed by previous generations; 
• provide its members with equitable rights of access to the legacy from past generations and conserve this 
access for future generations.  
 
3.3.4. Cost recovery and compensating externalities 
 
Due to the generally low price elasticity of demand, increasing prices result into increasing revenues. From an 
economic point of view, the first priority is to use these increased revenues to cover invested capital and 
operation and management costs. Cost recovery nullifies subsidies towards the privileged economic activities of 
industrial production and growing cash crops to the benefit of public funds. This study assumes that in many 
places there is scope for cost recovery of invested capital and operation and management costs. This is because 
the focus is on export commodities for which the cost component ‘water’ will remain minor. The findings of 
FAO (2004) and Perry (2001) support this assumption. In addition, the revenues make it possible to compensate 
for economic and ecological externalities. This compensation promotes social equity. 
 
3.3.5. Demand management: incentive for more water-efficient practices 
 
Full marginal cost pricing surely increases the producer’s need for water-efficient practices, but the producer 
must also have access to knowledge, technology and investment capital to implement such techniques. 
According to Perry (2001), the price of water must be significant in order to curtail demand, but the price 
structures and levels that are within politically feasible and acceptable range are usually too low to have a 
significant effect on demand. Contrary to what one might expect, the Water Pricing Protocol will not lower 
water demand drastically. 
 
Even when a producer manages to apply water-efficient practices, it is not certain that demand will decrease due 
to the ‘rebound effect’. The concept of a rebound effect (also known as the Khazzoom-Brookes postulate) 
comes from the energy sector and works as follows. Gains in the physical efficiency of water consumption will 
result in a per unit price reduction of water. As a result, consumption may increase, partially or even completely 
offsetting the impact of the initial physical gain.  
 
It is hard to predict the extent of the rebound effect in water consumption because research on this topic does not 
exist. Greening & Greene (1997) and Greening et al. (2000) provide for surveys of literature on the rebound 
effect in energy consumption. Greening & Greene (1997) identify three types of the rebound effect. The first 
type is the direct rebound effect: the increased use of energy services caused by lower prices per unit. The 
second type is the indirect rebound effect: because of lower costs of energy services, the consumer has more 
money to spend on all goods and services. Third, there are general equilibrium effects, which involve both 
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producers and consumers and represent the result of myriad adjustments of supply and demand in all sectors. 
Generally, researchers only account for the first type of the rebound effect (Herring, 2006).  
 
For water consumption, this study assumes that the extent of the rebound effect depends on whether water is a 
limiting production factor. If so, a physical efficiency gain enables a farmer just to produce more with the same 
amount of water and the rebound effect will approach 100%. If not, than water is not scarce. The price of water 
will probably not be high enough to make water efficiency measures attractive in the first place. Thus, water 
pricing is not effective for demand management. 
 
3.3.6. Re-allocation from low-value to high-value uses 
 
Water is generally allocated first to municipal and domestic use, second to industrial and commercial use, and 
third to agriculture (environmental allocations are also growing in volume and priority). This sequence of 
priorities is generally consistent with social and economic objectives that many would share. This fact, together 
with the bulkiness of water, does not invite for diversions from low-value (agricultural) use towards high-value 
(domestic and industrial) uses. Water pricing is only a means to give a higher priority to environmental water 
use. 
 
Within sectors, producers will try to get ‘more dollars per drop’. Farmers will choose to grow the crop that 
maximizes their net benefit. Tsur & Dinar (1997) give an example of how pricing methods can influence a 
farmer’s choice to grow a certain, more water-efficient, crop. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
3.4.1. Compatibility with Integrated Water Resources Management  
 
Proposing a Water Pricing Protocol implies that to date, no international agreement exists for water pricing. 
However, the process of integrated water resources management (IWRM) does account for economic 
instruments. The Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 has produced a Plan of 
Implementation1. By means of paragraph 26, Heads of States agreed to develop IWRM plans by the year 2005. 
Paragraph 26b accounts for economic instruments in general and full marginal cost pricing in specific only 
conservatively: “Employ the full range of policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring, voluntary 
measures, market and information-based tools, land–use management and cost recovery of water services, 
without cost recovery objectives becoming a barrier to access to safe water by poor people, and adopt an 
integrated water basin approach.” 
 
                                                 
1 Available at www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf 
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The Global Water Partnership provides for tools and good practices in an online IWRM toolbox2 for specialists 
and practitioners. According to this toolbox, economic instruments work best in combination with other 
supporting measures: they are unlikely to be effective acting alone. For successful application, economic 
instruments need appropriate standards (e.g. for discharges or surface water quality), effective administrative 
monitoring and enforcement capabilities, institutional co-ordination and economic stability. 
 
The concept of full marginal cost pricing is far from common practice in international water law, due to other 
governmental objectives, conceptual disagreement and operational limitations. Due to the limited scope of the 
Water Pricing Protocol, it is well possible to develop both the Protocol and IWRM plans.  
 
3.4.2. Conceptual disagreement about marginal cost pricing method 
 
Different scholars propose different methods to determine the full marginal cost of water. This study leaves one 
cost component out of the full marginal cost of water: the ‘opportunity cost’. The interpretation of opportunity 
costs varies among policy makers and scholars of water governance. Rogers et al. (1998) define opportunity 
costs as the total benefit foregone of the best alternative use. This view neglects the costs that would have been 
made in the best alternative use. In addition, Rogers et al. (1998) account for total benefits foregone even if 
satisfying the best alternative use does not depend on the use under consideration. An alternative definition is 
the net benefit foregone in the best alternative use, with the reservation that this marginal water amount is 
demanded by, but not supplied to the alternative user. In Section 3.3.6 we mentioned that water provision 
generally follows rules of priority. This way, no better alternative use exists and opportunity costs reduce to 
zero. The third interpretation of opportunity costs assumes that the use of water is at the cost of future 
opportunities. In this study, the scarcity rent accounts for this type of costs. The scarcity rent is the marginal 
opportunity cost imposed on future generations by extracting one more unit of a resource today. The scarcity 
rent is only non-zero in the case of depletion of water stocks. 
 
3.4.3. Alliance with EU and US agricultural subsidy structures 
 
When a substantial amount of countries complies with the Water Pricing Protocol, there are no comparative 
advantages from the perspective of water governance. However, water is only one production factor. Global 
trade in commodities is subject to market distortions that are far greater, for instance American and European 
agricultural subsidies. Political will to implement the Water Pricing Protocol increases when combined with the 
resolution of other distorting mechanisms in international trade. 
                                                 
2 The IWRM toolbox is available at www.gwptoolbox.org. 
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4. Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting 
 
4.1. Rationale 
 
Nowadays, the business society regards its economic performance in conjunction with its social and 
environmental performances (Steg et al., 2001). Regulatory compliance is not always sufficient to manage the 
negative environmental or social impacts of business operations effectively. Within this context, there are two 
pathways to address sustainability issues in the virtual water chain from a global perspective. 
 
The first pathway is an ´International Agreement on the Sustainable Production of water-intensive goods´. 
Governments may not be able to, or may not want to impose stringent rules. The formulation of internationally 
agreed standards, like the ISO 14000 series, forces producers to apply sound environmental production 
standards. While this is straightforward conceptually, it is almost impossible to implement practically. Criteria 
and data would need to be set at farm level. The interconnectedness of water systems and the large number of 
farmers make this expensive.  
 
The second pathway is a ‘Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods’. 
Companies are under pressure when they fail to manage negative social and environmental impacts. This raises 
three serious risks: (i) the threat of increased regulatory control by national governments and international 
organizations, (i) financial risks caused by pollution and large resource use, and (iii) damage to the corporate 
image (Rondinelli & Berry, 2000). Consequently, companies gain from proactive management of sustainability 
issues. The lack of internationally accepted reporting standards on what, when and where to report makes it 
difficult to assess sustainability, but a promising step has been made in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 
2000). The design and development of a measuring and reporting method for sustainability helps companies to 
compare trends of sustainable corporate performance over time, to compare results with targets and to 
benchmark companies against others (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2003). This study elaborates upon this second 
pathway. 
 
4.2. Institutional set-up  
 
4.2.1. Parties of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting 
 
In deciding on which parties to include in the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting on water-
intensive goods (in short: Business Agreement), it is important to note that a chain-based approach is preferable 
over a company-based approach in order to prevent companies to transfer negative effects of operations to other 
companies (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2003). The Business Agreement will be most effective when the key agents 
are involved. Hall (2000) uses the term ‘channel leader’ for a company that has sufficient power over suppliers 
to change its behaviour in a preferred direction. Hall (2000) claims that a channel leader with technical 
competencies and under specific environmental pressure can trigger chain dynamics.  
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This study identifies manufacturers (food processing companies) and large (western) retailers as candidates to 
be channel leaders in virtual water chains. This is supported by the achievements of the manufacturing company 
Unilever3 and the retailing company Sainsbury’s (Hall, 2000) in exercising their channel power in certain 
product chains. Channel leaders can be organized in the World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), an organization that is suitable to host the negotiation, formulation and enforcement of a Business 
Agreement. The WBCSD is a platform for some 190 companies to explore sustainable development, share 
knowledge, experiences and best practices, and to advocate business positions on these issues in a variety of 
forums, working with governments, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. Twenty-nine large 
multinational companies are organized in the World Business Council on Sustainable Development Water 
Working Group (WBCSD, 2007) and try to identify the roles businesses can play in collaborative actions for 
sustainable water management (WBCSD, 2005ab). This voluntary effort indicates that large multinational 
companies recognize the need for sustainable corporate performance in the field of water governance.  
 
4.2.2. Measuring and reporting method 
 
The parties of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting are free to agree on what and where to 
report. This section describes some general directions on these issues with relevance to global water governance. 
 
When deciding on what to report, it is essential to note that water scarcity is not the only issue in sustainability 
reporting. Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2003) provide for a literature study about the use of environmental indicators 
in food production systems. They found that such indicators often focus on events at a local level. The enormous 
number of indicators found in the literature generates too much data that often provide no additional knowledge 
on the environmental sustainability of a system. Moreover, although environmental research has addressed 
many aspects of sustainability, it has often ignored interactions. As a result, the understanding of total 
environmental implications of food production is poor. Gerbens-Leenes et al. (2003) propose a measuring 
method that uses three indicators to address global environmental issues: the use of energy (from both fossil and 
renewable sources), land and water. The systemic approach can calculate trade-offs along supply chains that 
make up a production system. The method produces three performance indicators: the total land, energy and 
water use per kilogram of available food. Measuring water use in the operations and supply chain of a business 
could be done following the methodology of ‘business water footprint accounting’ as described in Gerbens-
Leenes and Hoekstra (2008). In the Business Agreement, obtaining data is the responsibility of the channel 
leader.  
 
In addition, companies should decide on where to report. There are several ways to communicate the 
measurements through the supply chain. This study identifies three instruments to communicate measurements 
through the supply chain: (i) a sustainability label for consumers, (ii) a sustainability certificate for producers 
(business to business) and (iii) corporate responsibility publications. 
 
                                                 
3 Unilever assesses the water footprint of some of their products along the supply chain, and sets targets to reduce the water 
footprint of their products over a number of years. See www.unilever.com/ourvalues 
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A sustainability label informs consumers about characteristics of the product. A sustainability label provides for 
simple ‘yes-or-no’ distinctions: the production process is either sustainable or unsustainable. However, reality is 
often more complex than the simple dichotomy of a sustainability label presumes. For water-intensive products, 
product labelling is not appealing because it would be costly to monitor production practices and to preserve the 
information through the virtual water chain, especially compared to the benefit of such an effort. Only a very 
small percentage of consumers may choose to buy a less water-intensive product and, although this number is 
increasing, such people are destined to remain a minority4. 
 
A sustainability certificate does not put the label on products, but on producers. Certification is similar to 
labelling, because both activities require the definition of criteria at the farm level, a monitoring framework and 
an authority to give out the label or certificate. Certification is not appealing for producers of water-intensive 
products because commercial benefits of the system are lacking. 
 
Alternatively, channel leaders may report on sustainability issues in their corporate responsibility publications. 
Many multinational businesses already have such publications. Data generated can be used to regard trends over 
time, to compare results with targets and to benchmark a product against products of other companies (Gerbens-
Leenes et al., 2003). Corporate responsibility publications are the preferable tool to communicate about 
sustainability issues. 
 
4.2.3. Compliance mechanisms 
 
The Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting is voluntary by nature. In the absence of enforcement 
procedures, compliance must come from within the channel leaders themselves. The reporting method of the 
voluntary Business Agreement recognizes not only consumers and NGOs as important drivers of corporate 
responsibility, but also shareholders and employees. 
 
4.3. Assessment of effects 
 
4.3.1. Trade impacts for small producer firms in developing countries 
 
The Business Agreement intensifies buyer-supplier relations. The Agreement thus reinforces the position of 
large multinational companies as the channel leader of food production chains. Channel leaders can use their 
power to force local producers to implement more sustainable practices. On the one hand, this is exactly the aim. 
On the other hand, some may regard subjecting food producers of the developing world to the Business 
Agreement as a new form of imperialism.5  
 
                                                 
4 Richard Holland, WWF International Freshwater Programme, personal communication.  
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of closer buyer-supplier relations, consult Lyons et al. 
(1990), Barringer (1997) and Hall (2000). 
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Obviously, it is not the aim of designing the Business Agreement to give an opportunity to channel leaders to 
squeeze small producer firms in developing countries. Case studies on present sustainability labelling and 
certification schemes such as the Better Sugarcane Initiative (see below) will give valuable insights into these 
buyer-supplier relations in food production chains. 
 
4.3.2. Conservation of resources 
 
Ecological sustainability is the driving criterion of the Business Agreement. Effects on ecological sustainability 
(e.g. conservation of resources) will only take place when the Business Agreement alters behaviour of the agents 
in the virtual water chain. Of these agents, local producers are most capable of environmental innovation 
because of their direct contact with water resources. Farmers, however, often lack incentives to invest in 
environmental innovation because it does not directly improve their financial performance. This is the point 
where channel leaders become important ‘change agents’. While local producers may not be under 
environmental pressure, they are often under considerable pressure from their customer firms (Hall, 2000). That 
means that channel leaders should set targets to reduce the water footprint of their products. In order to reach 
these targets, the channel leader should exercise its channel power over local producers, who necessarily will 
adapt to the channel leader’s policy.  
 
The Business Agreement requires a sufficient degree of participation to be effective. In some virtual water 
chains of water-intensive commodities, many manufacturers or retailers may be active. Even if the degree of 
participation is sufficient, monitoring and reporting will not lead to more sustainable practices directly. 
Increasing sustainability requires behavioural change. There are promising signs of such behavioural change in 
virtual water chains. A good example is the ‘Better Sugarcane Initiative’, a collaboration of progressive 
sugarcane retailers, investors, traders, producers and NGOs who are committed to developing internationally 
applicable measures and baselines that define sustainable sugar cane6. Implementation of the Business 
Agreement is much easier when connected with such initiatives. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
4.4.1. Adequacy of the standard 
 
One of the most complex issues in the Business Agreement is deciding on an adequate measuring and reporting 
standard for the ecological and social issues. Certain issues will require tailor-made standards, while this study 
only suggests a general method, limited to ecological sustainability. This is why channel leaders, in cooperation 
with their branch of industry, should decide on what standard to use.  
 
Section 4.2 focuses on ecological sustainability. In reality, businesses regard their overall economic, ecological 
and social performance. Further development of this institutional arrangement should focus on the interaction 
with the broader environmental, economic and social context. 
                                                 
6 More information on the Better Sugarcane Initiative can be found at www.bettersugarcane.org. 
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4.4.2. Compatibility with international law 
 
It is likely that the Business Agreement will reinforce international social and environmental law. Since the 
Business Agreement is a voluntary scheme, it may even set higher goals than the norms enforceable in 
contemporary international law. Therefore, conflicts with international law are most likely to be on the subject 
of economic efficiency. The legitimate concerns for environmental and social justice may pose an obstacle to 
international trade. 
 
Three determinants express the extent to which the Business Agreement is compatible with WTO trade rules: (i) 
the nature of the instruments applied; (ii) whether compliance is mandatory or voluntary; and (iii) the degree of 
public intervention (Van der Grijp et al., 2004). The instrument proposed is a mere measuring and reporting 
system, with limited regulation. Participation is voluntary and the role for governmental agencies is limited. 
Thus, the Business Agreement is not likely to be in conflict with WTO trade rules. 
 
Individual states are very cautious in regulating the market for sustainable products. The fact that many 
sustainability labelling and certification schemes are subsidized by public funds witness the strategy of 
governments to hide behind private initiatives in order to avoid formal litigation (Van der Grijp et al., 2004). 
This study assumes that for this reason public funds are available to subsidize part of the Business Agreement. 
 
4.4.3. Corporate responsibility or public intervention 
 
The Business Agreement is a private undertaking to organize the sustainable use of water resources around the 
globe. In doing so, it aims to fill the gap provided by national and international regulation as a consequence of 
conflicting mechanisms at various governance levels, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, or simply remaining 
silent (Van der Grijp et al., 2004).  
 
There are three ways to think of the relationship between public intervention and the Business Agreement (or 
sustainability reporting in general). The first way of thought is that the Business Agreement is more effective 
than public intervention. In this view, the Business Agreement facilitates experiments with educational 
activities, innovative technologies initiated by channel leaders or local governance structures for which 
regulatory measures are not flexible enough. Costly enforcement mechanisms are unnecessary, and the 
organizational continuity and effectiveness is in the hand of strong multinational companies with sufficient 
funds. The aim for the Business Agreement is then to increase the number of participants. 
 
The second way of thought is that, although public intervention is preferable in the end, the Business Agreement 
can act as a catalyst for such public intervention. In this view, the Business Agreement triggers the provision of 
a participatory infrastructure, a monitoring regime, knowledge about sustainability issues at all levels of 
governance and draft criteria and principles. The aim for the Business Agreement is then to promote an 
integrated, chain-based approach. 
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The third way of thought condemns the Business Agreement, for it distracts from the moral obligation of 
governments to protect natural resources and promote the welfare of the disadvantaged. In this view, 
governmental subsidies to private schemes are at the cost of means to support public intervention. The aim 
should be to object to the whole concept of the Business Agreement and to terminate its existence. 
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5. Water Footprint Permits  
 
5.1. Rationale 
 
The idea of water footprint permits follows from the understanding that every individual has a right to 
appropriate a certain amount of global fresh water resources (Petrella, 2001; Barlow & Clarke, 2002) and that 
total appropriation should not exceed the carrying capacity of the Earth. Water footprint permits are tradable to 
promote not only an equitable, but also an efficient allocation of water footprint permits. As a system, water 
footprint permits are comparable to the well-known Kyoto Protocol that assigns (tradable) quotas of carbon 
dioxide emissions.  
 
5.2. Institutional set-up  
 
5.2.1. Parties of the system of Water Footprint Permits 
 
The nature of the system of Water Footprint Permits requires high-level political attention. Therefore, this study 
proposes that nations constitute a new General Assembly of the system of Water Footprint Permits. Every six 
years, the General Assembly decides upon the maximum global water footprint permit. This period of six years 
is convenient, because it enables to flatten year-to-year variability of water supply and demand, it does not 
demand a great deal of time of the General Assembly, and the proposal to the decision can be prepared by the 
ministerial conference of the triennial World Water Forum.  
 
The General Assembly allocates Water Footprint Permits to nations, not to individuals. The allocation of 
permits to individuals would be an important awareness-raising instrument. When people are aware of the 
consequences of their consumption, they might reconsider their consumption pattern to the benefit of the Earth’s 
water resources. However, five reasons limit the feasibility of this option. First, many human beings in the 
developing world are not registered and thus practically unable to exercise their rights. Second, it would be 
virtually impossible to get a substantial amount of individuals together to participate in the voluntary scheme of 
water footprint permits. Third, it would be extremely difficult to monitor individual’s water footprints. Fourth, 
compliance at the individual level will be difficult to achieve. Fifth, individuals are not the natural entities for 
allocation of water, but rather communities. Thus, this study chooses to elaborate on the mode in which 
maximum water footprint permits are allocated to nations. This is convenient, because the legal system and 
monitoring infrastructure is already largely in place at this level. Moreover, the most promising options to match 
actual water footprints with water footprint permits feature at the national level (see Section 5.2.5). 
 
5.2.2. Defining a maximum global water footprint 
 
Though estimates of the annual volume of rainfall over land are available (Shiklomanov, 2000), it is very 
difficult to give a global figure for a maximum sustainable global water footprint. Various reasons for this 
include (i) uncertain environmental flow requirements, (ii) disputable level of water use efficiency, and (iii) 
unknown potential for rain-fed agriculture (Hoekstra, 2006). According to an estimate of Hoekstra (2007), 
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human appropriation of ‘green water resources’ (soil moisture from rain) is 8% and the human appropriation of 
‘blue water resources’ (surface and groundwater) 17%. Postel et al. (1996) take much broader definitions of 
green and blue water use and arrive at appropriation estimates of 26% and 54% respectively. This appropriation 
obviously leads to unsustainable conditions in many places throughout the world, as witnessed by the reported 
cases of water depletion (UN-Water, 2003; 2006).  
 
Not only is it hard to determine a maximum sustainable global water footprint, it would lead to a suboptimal 
outcome from both the economic and the environmental perspective. Determining the environment for which to 
define environmental flow requirements is arbitrary and subject to trade-offs. From an environmental 
perspective, presuming the existence of a maximum sustainable global water footprint that simply represents the 
difference between annual renewable water resources and environmental water requirements implies that not 
using water resources up to this maximum would be a waste of renewable resources. From an economic 
perspective, the negotiated maximum footprint is not necessarily the most efficient threshold.  
 
This study proposes the following pragmatic solution to this problem. When parties agree on the rationale of 
tradable water footprint permits, this system needs to allocate sufficiently low rations in order to be effective. 
Low rations make water footprint permits scarce, their value becomes higher, and the evolving trade system will 
strengthen the institutional arrangement. This trade system gives the opportunity to impose an overhead charge 
needed to operate and maintain the system of water footprint permits. On the other hand, when rations are set 
too low, non-compliance becomes an attractive option to many and the institutional arrangement will be 
ineffective. Within these boundaries, it seems feasible to negotiate a maximum global water footprint.  
 
In defining the maximum global water footprint and in issuing water footprint permits, one will have to 
distinguish between a green, blue and grey component. These components refer to evaporated rainwater, 
evaporated ground/surface water and polluted water respectively. The grey water footprint can be quantified by 
assessing the volume of water that is required to dilute pollutants to such an extent that the quality of the water 
remains above agreed water quality standards. 
 
Like many environmental regimes, the system of water footprint permits depends on voluntary cooperation 
between nations. The actual size of the maximum water footprint will therefore be a political question driven by 
environmental science, comparable to the procedure followed under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change.  
 
5.2.3. Allocating the maximum global water footprint permit to nations 
 
The maximum global water footprint is to be allocated among the people of the Earth. Either historical use 
rights or ethical reasoning can guide such allocation. Typically, historical use rights guide the allocation of 
natural resources. The Kyoto Protocol, for instance, applies this allocation mechanism. It is thus conceivable 
that the allocation of water footprint permits is subject to bargaining between agents, where some agents will 
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use their contemporary high water footprints as an argument for a large share of the global maximum water 
footprint.  
 
Ethical reasoning starts with stating that every human being has a moral right to appropriate the same amount of 
water resources. However, some people live under unfavourable climatic conditions compared to others, while 
they rely largely on domestic food production for their nutrition. Because these people are least advantaged, 
they should receive some compensation in the form of a higher tolerable water footprint. Then, making the 
permits tradable enables the permits to flow towards high-valued uses, without compromising the basic needs of 
poor people. Selling part of their water footprint permit even generates income for the poor. The permits should 
be set for one year or maybe some subsequent years. This recurrent assessment possesses the virtue that people 
can reconsider how much of their water footprint to keep, so the rationing system will not restrict economic 
development.   
 
5.2.4. Monitoring water footprints of nations 
 
Hoekstra & Chapagain (2007, 2008) provide for an analytical framework for the assessment of virtual water 
content of commodities, virtual water flows and water footprints. The virtual water content of a product is the 
volume of freshwater used to produce the product, which depends on the water use in the various steps of the 
production chain. The virtual water content of a product breaks down into a green, blue and grey component, 
which refers to evaporated rainwater, evaporated ground/surface water and polluted water respectively. 
 
International virtual water flows can be calculated by multiplying commodity trade flows by their associated 
virtual water content. If the exporting country does not produce a commodity itself, but only imports it for 
further export, one should take the virtual-water content of the product as in the country of origin. 
 
The water footprint of a nation can be assessed through either a bottom-up or a top-down approach. In the 
bottom-up approach, the water footprint of a nation is calculated by multiplying all goods and services 
consumed by the inhabitants of a country by the respective virtual water contents of those goods and services. It 
is straightforward, although data demanding. Alternatively, one can use the top-down approach, which takes 
total water use in a country as a starting-point and then subtracts the part of the water used for making export 
products and adds the incoming virtual water flow.  
 
This analytical framework forms the base of the monitoring effort needed in the system of water footprint 
permits. It is comprehensive in the way that it accounts for blue, green and grey water use. The level of detail is 
sufficient for the permit system. However, the method needs improvement before it is applicable for recurrent 
monitoring. First, the grey water component should be introduced into the water footprint of nations as defined 
by Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004). Second, uncertainty analysis should be carried out to be clear about the 
limitations of the method. Third, all state parties should make transparent monitoring data available recurrently 
on a year-to-year base. Finally, one will have to address the issue that consuming one cubic metre of water in 
one place is not necessarily comparable in terms of its environmental or social impact to consuming one cubic 
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metre of water in another place. This can be solved by either weighting the water volumes consumed based on 
their relative impact or setting spatially and temporally explicit standards with respect to the maximum water 
footprint such that the (marginal) impact of a water footprint in one place/period become comparable with the 
impact in another place/period. 
 
5.2.5. Five national responses to match footprint to permit 
 
The effectiveness of the system of Water Footprint Permits results from the actions taken by agents to match the 
national water footprint to their water footprint permit. Five options exist for nations, the primary agents of this 
institutional arrangement. The first one is to buy part of the permit of another country. The attractiveness of this 
option depends on the price and available quantity of permits. The second option is to improve water-inefficient 
practices in the country where major imports come from. Creating incentives for virtual water importing 
countries will generate funds to invest in efficient and sustainable agricultural practices. The third option is to 
shift imports towards more water-efficient regions. The fourth option is to appropriate water that is not included 
in the maximum global water footprint, most notably salt water. When nations invest in desalination they 
augment the water resource base (to the detriment of their energy resources). It is fair that nations profit from 
their own effort. The fifth option is to change total consumption or the consumption pattern of the nation. This 
option implies to involve the nation’s inhabitants, either by awareness raising instruments (e.g. scaling down the 
water footprint permit) or by taxes on water-intensive products.  
 
Beforehand, there is no preferred set of options for a country to match their water footprint permit. Particular 
characteristics and circumstances lead to different sets of preferred actions. It will remain within national 
sovereignty to determine this set of actions. Whatever the set of actions, consumer awareness about their water 
footprint will increase. 
 
5.2.6. Compliance mechanisms 
 
Countries comply with the permit system when their actual water footprint is equal to or smaller than their 
acquired water footprint permit. Non-compliance occurs when a nation’s actual water footprint is larger than its 
permit. Three situations may occur. In the first situation, all countries have remained within their ration. There is 
no compliance problem, but the rations in the next period of six years may be set lower. In the second situation, 
some countries have consumed more than their permit allows them to, while others have consumed less. In 
retrospect, countries can trade water footprint permits for the period at hand without further regulatory 
measures. Third, the majority of countries have a larger water footprint than their permits allow them to. For this 
situation, a clear penalty system should be in place. The collection of penalties creates a fund that can be used to 
back the restoration of local systems that have suffered most from depletion and degradation during the period 
under consideration. In this respect, much can be learned from the Kyoto Protocol process, for which 
compliance mechanisms must be in place when the emission target deadline of 2012 passes. 
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A major compliance issue is of methodological nature: the time lag between determining a nation’s water 
footprint permit and its actual water footprint. The water footprint permit for a certain period (six years, see 
Section 5.2.1) is determined by setting a global maximum beforehand and allocating this permit among nations. 
The actual water footprint is determined by evaluating climatic parameters, crop parameters, crop product 
yields, international trade data, and industrial and domestic water withdrawals7 afterwards. One way to 
minimize this problem is to predict the actual water footprint. Probably, the water footprint of nations is not very 
volatile, so trend analysis of national water footprints would provide for a sufficient certainty of prediction. 
 
5.3. Assessment of effects 
 
5.3.1. Poverty alleviation 
 
This study proposes that nations that aim to have a larger water footprint than their equitable share allows them 
to, can buy some of the permit of countries that are satisfied with a lower water footprint. This trading system 
leads to cross-subsidies from countries with large water footprints towards countries with low water footprints, 
virtually to reward them for their higher conservation of global water resources. If high water footprints 
positively correlate with high incomes, these cross-subsidies lead to poverty alleviation. 
 
Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) found a positive relation between per capita Gross National Income (GNI) and 
domestic water consumption, as well as between per capita GNI and the water footprint resulting from industrial 
consumption. They did not find a relation between per capita GNI and the water footprint resulting from the 
consumption of agricultural commodities. The reason is that other factors – climate, agricultural practice and 
consumption pattern – interfere to such extent that these factors should be filtered out first in order to see the 
individual effect of GNI per capita.  
 
In Section 5.2.3 we have argued that people living under unfavourable climatic conditions and highly dependent 
on domestic food production should receive compensation in their share of the maximum global water footprint. 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to refine the analysis of Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004) to find a 
positive relation between GNI per capita and the water footprint because of consumption of agricultural 
commodities. It suffices to say that using a ‘climate compensation factor’ and/or a ‘water productivity 
compensation factor’ will probably produce a positive relation. 
 
Note that the improvement of poor agricultural practices, funded by donor countries, directly leads to poverty 
alleviation. 
 
                                                 
7 These parameters are derived from Chapagain & Hoekstra (2004), but may be extended with parameters to incorporate 
dilution water (grey water). 
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5.3.2. Conservation of water resources 
 
Conservation of water resources occurs when countries shift imports towards water-efficient regions, improve 
water-inefficient agricultural practices domestically or abroad, lower their total consumption or change towards 
a more water-extensive consumption pattern. 
 
5.3.3. Transaction costs exceed benefits 
 
It is conceivable that transaction costs will exceed the benefits. Transaction costs consist of costs for 
information, negotiation, definition and enforcement of a contract (Hazeu, 2000). Further quantification of these 
transaction costs and benefits delivers further insight on this matter. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
5.4.1. Incompatibility with international environmental law 
 
Water footprint permits underscore the environmental limitations to human behaviour. Implementing the 
concept of water footprint permits could be in direct conflict with the influential Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration: “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (UNCHE, 1972).” 
 
Geographical spread of water availability becomes less important in the system of Water Footprint Permits. 
Water-rich countries will try to hang on to their state sovereignty over natural resources. However, in 
international politics in the past, environmental regimes have evolved based on voluntary collective action. The 
permit system requires a certain degree of participation to have a significant effect, but it does not need a 
unanimous consensus.  
 
5.4.2. Political unfeasibility 
 
Water footprint permits seem to be largely to the benefit of developing countries with low consumption. Thus, it 
is possible that countries with a large water footprint will not participate in a permit system, comparable to the 
US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. Obviously, this is a major issue for the permit system. However, this study 
identifies three aspects that make it more likely that nations will cooperate.  
 
First, such reasoning typically belongs to the tradition of realism and neglects a liberal view to world politics. 
The permit system is a voluntary system, in which bargaining over the size of the permitted global maximum 
water footprint leaves room for national interests. Second, the contemporary distribution of water footprints is 
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not morally justifiable8. When all human beings would have a water footprint equal to that of the average US 
citizen, human appropriation of water resources would double (Chapagain & Hoekstra, 2004). This 
appropriation cannot be considered to remain within environmental limits. Transnational NGOs make 
governments, producers and consumers aware of that. Third, it is possible to break the seemingly obvious link 
between economic growth and increased water use, by applying techniques in agriculture that augment the ‘crop 
per drop’. Self-restraint and economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive aims. 
 
5.4.3. Alliance with an ecological footprint permit 
 
Freshwater is not the only natural resource that suffers from scarcity at the global level. Other important scarce 
resources that sustain our lifestyles are various types of lands and energy carriers. The water footprint concept 
has been derived from the ecological footprint concept put forward by Rees & Wackernagel (1996). Where the 
water footprint determines the amount of freshwater (in m3) that is needed to sustain the consumption pattern of 
an individual or nation, the ecological footprint does the same for productive land (in ha) (Hoekstra, 2007). The 
ecological footprint converts human consumption of food (including fish), energy and forest products to a 
certain amount of land and adds it to the amount of land needed for the built-up environment. 
 
Though the water footprint and ecological footprint are measured in different units (m3/capita vs. m2/capita), the 
rationale for a permit system is similar for both concepts. The feasibility and usefulness of a water footprint 
permit system increases when combined with an ecological footprint permit system. The need for a permit 
system is even higher for ecological footprints than for water footprints, because the global ecological footprint 
exceeds the Earth’s biocapacity by 23% (WWF, 2006) or 39% (Venetoulis & Talberth, 2006).  
 
 
                                                 
8 Moral justice is best represented here by Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: “I ought never to act except in such a 
way that I can also want that my maxim should become a universal law.”  
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6. Synthesis 
 
The preceding sections describe conceivable and – under certain assumptions – feasible institutional arrangements 
for global water governance that promote social equity, ecological sustainability and economic efficiency.  
 
Table 6.1 presents the rationale for and the key features of the institutional arrangements. Figure 6.1 displays the 
behavioural mechanisms through the virtual water chain, triggered by the institutional arrangements. Table 6.2 
summarizes the assessment of effects and topics of discussion by means of a SWOT-analysis (the analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats). It shows differences in the extent to which the institutional 
arrangements address the three criteria of sustainable development. In addition, the Table gives the opportunity 
to relate the institutional arrangements to each other.  
 
Table 6.1: Key features of three global institutional arrangements. 
 Water Pricing Protocol Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting Water Footprint Permits 
Rationale Full marginal cost pricing 
increases efficiency. The 
deadlock of countries 
unwilling to restrain 
themselves requires 
international cooperation. 
Companies gain from 
proactively addressing 
environmental sustainability 
issues. The Agreement 
channels business efforts to 
increase the environmental 
sustainability of their 
activities. 
Every individual has a right 
to appropriate a certain 
amount of global fresh 
water resources and total 
appropriation should not 
exceed the carrying 
capacity of the Earth. 
Change 
agents 
National governments Word Business Council on 
Sustainable Development 
National governments 
Primary 
agents 
Producers Food processors; 
Retailers 
Consumers 
Substantive 
elements 
▪ Full marginal cost pricing 
method 
▪ Fund allocation method 
▪ Measuring method  
▪ Reporting method 
▪ Maximum global water 
footprint definition 
▪ Permit allocation 
▪ Monitoring framework 
Behavioural 
mechanism 
Price increase is passed on, 
ultimately to consumers 
Channel leadership involves 
the producers; 
Sustainability reporting 
involves consumers 
Various instruments are 
available to national 
governments to involve all 
agents in the virtual water 
chain 
 
 
The effectiveness of the institutional arrangements is subject to risks. The main risk of the Water Pricing Protocol 
is the assumption that national governments, with some assistance, will be able to have domestic institutions in 
place to arrange the various steps of water pricing. Various reasons may limit the implementation of water 
pricing: financial capacity, interference with cultural heritage (for instance the warabandi system in Pakistan and 
India), and physical constraints of metering (the uncontrolled flooding of terraces in South-East Asia). 
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The main risk of the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting is that there is no separation of powers, or 
trias politica. Thus, the Business Agreement is not binding. The platform that will draft the Business Agreement 
(the World Business Council on Sustainable Development as proposed) should be as autonomous as possible in 
order to account for effective enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The main risk of Water Footprint Permits is that the transaction costs will outweigh the benefits of the system. 
Apart from monitoring efforts, the system requires a great deal of political attention. Necessarily, the system 
should seek strategic cooperation. A system of Ecological Footprint Permits would be a promising partner for 
the system of Water Footprint Permits. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Behavioural mechanisms triggered by institutional arrangements. [WBCSD = World Business Council 
on Sustainable Development] 
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Table 6.2: Summary of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the institutional arrangements. 
 Water Pricing Protocol Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting Water Footprint Permits 
Strengths ▪ Privileged economic 
sectors less dependent on 
public funds  
▪ Efficient crop patterns 
▪ Cost recovery 
▪ Compensation for 
externalities 
▪ Restoration of depleted 
resources 
▪ Optimization comparative 
advantages 
▪ Awareness of water 
footprint through business 
society 
▪ Conservation of resources 
▪ Reduced risk of regulation, 
environmental degradation 
and corporate image 
▪ Increased corporate 
responsibility 
▪ Awareness of water 
footprint through 
government & civil society 
▪ Equal right to the global 
water footprint 
▪ Poverty alleviation  
▪ Conservation of resources 
▪ Tradability of permits 
contributes to efficient 
allocation of water 
resources 
Weaknesses ▪ Irrigation less competitive 
than rain-fed agriculture  
▪ Increased food prices 
▪ Ecological sustainability 
not guaranteed  
▪ High domestic transaction 
costs (pricing, metering, 
billing, fee collection, fund 
allocation)  
▪ Moderate transaction 
costs (monitoring) 
▪ Reinforced power ‘channel 
leaders’ over local 
producers 
▪ Arrangement  is a 
substitute for strong 
regulation  
▪ Lack of enforcement 
mechanisms 
▪ Local overexploitation 
remains possible  
▪ High transaction costs 
(negotiation, contract 
design, monitoring, 
enforcement) 
 
Opportunities ▪ Alliance with reduction 
farm subsidies in 
industrialized countries 
▪ Link up with the Global 
Reporting Initiative 
▪ Alliance with Ecological 
Footprint Permits 
 
Threats ▪ Domestic ability to apply 
marginal cost pricing 
▪ Interference with cultural 
heritage 
▪ Adequacy of the reporting 
standard 
▪ States’ adherence to 
sovereignty over natural 
resources 
▪ Monitoring method not 
solid enough as a basis for 
international law 
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7. Discussion 
 
The involvement of other scientific disciplines other than water governance would strongly mature the design 
and assessment of institutional arrangements. Particularly the fields of economics, law and public administration 
could provide for greater insight and better quality of the institutional designs. Apart from integration across 
disciplines, further research should take a multi-level approach. The institutional designs in this study suffer 
from generalizations and assumptions that will have unanticipated effects at the river basin or local level. The 
other way around, institutions at the local or river basin level may be more effective in promoting the criteria of 
sustainable development at the global level. 
 
The institutional arrangements are not mutually exclusive. Table 6.2 helps to identify opportunities and threats 
of simultaneous implementation of the institutional arrangements. Combinations that reduce negative effects are 
promising. The Table reads that all three institutional arrangements require monitoring efforts, which could be 
combined. On the other hand, combinations may be less effective than the sum of effects of the separate 
institutional arrangements. When a Business Agreement leads to the conservation of water resources, fewer 
opportunities to reduce human water use exist for a system of Water Footprint Permits. A combination of Water 
Footprint Permits and the Business Agreement is promising, because governments, civil society and business 
society involve in the equitable and sustainable appropriation of global water resources. 
 
With reference to the individual arrangements, further research could explore strategic alliances. The Water 
Pricing Protocol would be much more effective when coupled to a global agreement on directing agricultural 
subsidies. The system of Water Footprint Permits should seek cooperation with the field of Ecological Footprint 
analysis. In addition, case studies will provide more detailed information on the behavioural mechanisms of the 
institutional arrangements. For the Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting, the search for simple but 
comprehensive indicators of ecological sustainability is ongoing. In this regard, the effort of the Better 
Sugarcane Initiative is promising. The Better Sugarcane Initiative is very relevant for this arrangement, because 
it takes a life-cycle approach, it involves different stakeholders across the virtual water chain and the water-
intensive sugarcane is traded worldwide.  
 
Global water governance is new as a research topic. The three institutional arrangements in this study are 
explorations of ways in which human society can deal with the global dimension of water governance. The 
design of these arrangements is only a first step towards a multidisciplinary debate on global water governance. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
In general, freshwater availability, use and scarcity are addressed at the local or river basin level. However, 
demand for water-intensive commodities (i.e. particularly agricultural commodities) increasingly induces export 
flows and the emergence of a global market. Economic development, for example in China, stimulates demand 
for commodities that cannot be produced in the country itself. The increasing importance of international trade 
in agricultural commodities on a global market results in large virtual water flows from one river basin to 
another, creating a link in socio-economic and political sense between water systems that are disconnected from 
a hydrological point of view (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2008). From the societal perspective, freshwater 
becomes important at a global level and should also be addressed at that level.  
 
The sustainable use of freshwater on a global level includes social equity, ecological sustainability and 
economic efficiency. All humans have similar rights for freshwater, ecosystems should be maintained, and water 
should be used as efficient as possible. To address the three dimensions of the sustainable use of water, we 
propose three institutional arrangements: the Water Pricing Protocol, the Business Agreement on Sustainable 
Reporting and the Water Footprint Permits. The Water Pricing Protocol increases efficient water use by full 
marginal cost pricing and passes costs on to final consumers. The Business Agreement on Sustainable Reporting 
stimulates business to use freshwater in a sustainable way. This arrangement adopts the systems approach from 
life cycle analysis and introduces the concept of the virtual water chain. The Water Footprint Permits are based 
on the principles that every individual has a right to a certain amount of freshwater and that total appropriation 
should not exceed the carrying capacity of the earth. The three arrangements are not mutually exclusive but 
supplementary and strengthen each other in such a way that freshwater is used in a sustainable manner on a 
global level.  
 
The institutional arrangements for global governance address not only governments and businesses, but also 
private consumers creating a shared responsibility for this natural resource. The study has explored options for 
institutional arrangements but acknowledges that the further design and development requires large efforts from 
the international community. From this perspective, this study is a first step towards the creation of international 
freshwater governance.   
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